Institutional virtue: how consensus matters by Konzelmann Ziv, Anita
Institutional virtue: how consensus matters
Anita Konzelmann Ziv
Published online: 21 April 2012
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract The paper defends the thesis that institutional virtue is properly modeled
as a ‘‘consensual’’ property, along the lines of the Lehrer–Wagner model of con-
sensus (LWC). In a first step, I argue that institutional virtue is not exhausted by
duty-fulfilling, since institutions, contrary to natural individuals, are designed to
fulfill duties. To avoid the charge of vacuity, virtue, if attributed to institutions, must
be able to motivate supererogatory action. In a second step, I argue against dis-
continuity of institutional virtue with individual virtue. Two main arguments for
discontinuity of collective properties display serious shortcomings when applied to
virtues of institutions. Given that motivation for supererogatory action is neither
inferred from statutory duties nor accommodates a right of reprobation, modeling
institutional virtue on collective rationality or explaining it in terms of joint com-
mitment both prove problematic. In a third step, I argue that LWC has the
explanatory potential to account for institutional virtue. Due to its main features,
iteration and evaluation, it provides a non-trivial analysis of continuity and thereby
satisfies basic constraints on the notion of genuine institutional virtue.
Keywords Consensus  (Dis)continuity  Evaluation  Institutional virtue 
Supererogatory action
It has been argued that ‘‘it is sometimes possible and reasonable to ascribe virtues to
collectives’’ and that this practice might help to deal with the situationist challenge
in virtue ethics (Sandin 2007, p. 303). More specifically, it has been argued that
attributing virtues such as ‘‘testimonial justice’’ to institutional groups can account
for a society’s legitimacy and freedom (Fricker 2010, p. 250f). And it has even been
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suggested that corporations, in virtue of their constitution, ‘‘will probably prove
more capable of consistent and dependable ethical behaviour than humans’’ (French
1995, p. 80). Advocates of the existence of institutional virtue univocally claim that
an institution G’s virtue V must be accounted for in terms of a property that is not
necessarily continuous with a property V of G’s individual members. Fricker argues
that a ‘‘non-summative account’’ is needed to model collective virtue, and she takes
it that ‘‘the model given by Gilbert in her classic notion of a ‘plural subject’ […]
provides an excellent template for our thinking about group virtue’’ (Fricker 2010,
p. 240). Referring to French’s characterization of institutions as ‘‘conglomerate
collectivities’’ whose ‘‘identity is not exhausted by the identities’’ of their individual
members, Sandin takes ‘‘conglomerates’’ to be the suitable ‘‘candidates for
ascriptions of collective virtue’’ (Sandin 2007, p. 305). He thereby suggests that
collective virtues are not distributions of individual virtues.1
Thinking about manifestations of institutional virtue, the recent example of the
Fukushima fire brigade’s bravery comes to our mind. It seems that even skeptics of
the idea of institutional virtue cannot but accept that attribution of bravery to the
brigade is the right kind of qualifying its behavior. Granted some convenience of
attributing virtues to collectives, particularly to institutional groups, the present
paper aims at elucidating the question to what extent collectivist accounts can
satisfy the requirements of virtue ascriptions to institutions. Contrary to distributive
or aggregate accounts, collectivist accounts defend the view that the properties of
collectives are discontinuous with the properties of their individual members. On
the grounds of the moral role that virtues play in motivating an agent’s course of
action I will first argue that an institution’s genuine virtues cannot be discontinuous
with the individual virtues of its members. Then I will show how the Lehrer–
Wagner account of consensus (LWC) models collective properties that are non-
trivially continuous with individual properties. In the third section of the paper I will
argue that the relevant requirements an account of institutional virtues must meet
are all satisfied by LWC. I conclude that we might indeed have good reasons to
attribute virtues to institutions, provided we model them in terms of ‘‘consensual’’
properties.
1 The problem of institutional virtue
In her 2010 paper Can There Be Institutional Virtues? Fricker develops an account
of collective virtues on the basis of Gilbert’s model of ‘‘Plural Subjects’’. Fricker’s
central claim is that institutions can be literally attributed virtues, notwithstanding
whether they are conceived of in terms of genuine individuals (irreducible unit),
clusters of individuals (reducible unit), or institutional structure (formal, procedural
features). Moreover, Fricker claims that her account is not dependent on some
specific view on virtues, i.e. accommodates virtues conceived both in terms of
motivational character traits and in terms of skills. Given that the first of these
1 The central point of Sandin’s argument for collective virtue is the relative stableness of institutions that
makes them likely bearers of enduring character traits (op. cit., 306).
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conjuncts is the more controversial issue, I will henceforth consider the question of
attributing virtues to collectives as the question of whether and how morally
relevant motivational attitudes might be attributed to collectives. I will follow
Fricker in focusing on ‘‘institutional virtues’’, i.e. virtues attributed to social entities
which display a normative structure, realized in statutory duties, status roles, and
rules of conduct. But contrary to Fricker and other authors, I believe that the nature
of institutions rather challenges than favors attributions of genuine virtues. The
difficulty, I think, resides in the fact that institutions, contrary to individual persons,
are instrumental units, designed to fulfill the tasks they are created for. If being
virtuous is identified with the motivation to reliably fulfilling one’s task,
institutional virtue seems to be a rather flat concept. Following directly from its
existence, an institution’s motivation to fulfill the tasks it is designed for is
constitutive of it. Lacking this ‘‘virtue’’, an institution would miss its ‘‘raison d’eˆtre’’
and thereby call into question its very existence, while having it does not seem to
add anything to being an institution. It therefore seems as if a philosophical problem
related to virtue and institutions arises only if virtue is not identified with fulfilling
statutory duties. The crucial question then is whether institutions are capable of
supererogatory action. In this case, there is a need for institutions to have virtues of
a more substantial kind, i.e. properties motivating institutions to act beyond what
they are designed for. It is arguable, however, whether institutional virtues of this
kind are explicable in terms of properties discontinuous (or only contingently
continuous) with motivational attitudes of the institution’s individual members.
As an example of institutional vice and virtue, Fricker mentions the case of ‘‘non-
individual-based’’ racism in a police unit, to which corresponds the unit’s
correlative lack of the virtue of ‘‘testimonial justice’’ (Fricker 2010, p. 251). The
case is intended to show how the presence and absence of institutional vices and
virtues impinge on a society’s legitimacy and freedom. Fricker thereby refers to the
‘‘contestability condition’’, constitutive of Pettit’s characterization of freedom as
security against arbitrary interference: ‘‘What is required for non-arbitrariness in the
exercise of a certain power is […] the permanent possibility of effectively
contesting it’’ (Pettit 1997, p. 63). To secure this possibility, institutions such as
appointment panels, courts, or police forces are required to display the virtue of
testimonial justice, and this in turn requires their members to ‘‘jointly commit to
neutralizing prejudice’’ when they judge the credibility of a contester’s voice
(Fricker 2010, p. 250). In contrast, institutional prejudice, e.g. tacit racism, is
considered an institutional vice that will deflate credibility and thereby annul
contestability.
One principal worry about this view on institutional virtue and vice concerns the
possibility of jointly committing to being virtuous. Unquestionably, we can jointly
commit to ways of behavior, for example to applying certain prescriptions and thus
satisfying the statutory or legal requirements of the institution we are members of. It
is arguable, however, whether we can jointly commit to having attitudinal
properties, viz. character traits. I will not enter into a discussion of this issue here,
but it is worth being kept in mind, since the possibility of doing things for different
reasons and out of different motives hinges on it, and this possibility imports on
ascriptions of virtue. A more relevant question in the present context is whether
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fulfilling statutory requirements shall count as virtuous act. The requirement of
neutralizing prejudice, i.e. the criterion for the police unit manifesting the virtue of
testimonial justice in Fricker’s example, belongs to (or directly follows from) the
statutory requirements for institutions with judicative and executive tasks (at least in
democratic societies). A court whose members do not regard it as their statutory
duty to neutralize prejudice would count as disqualified from the outset.
Consequently, if the court members jointly commit to neutralizing prejudice, they
commit to satisfying a statutory requirement of the institution they constitute.
The answer to the question of whether fulfilling a statutory requirement is a
virtuous act seems to depend on the moral theory one adopts. In duty based ethics,
being virtuous boils down to fulfilling one’s duties. The same applies to utilitarian
ethics. Given that the supreme value of maximal welfare defines the moral obligation
to pursue this goal in the best possible way, virtue is exhausted by satisfying this
requirement. Identifying virtue with fulfilling duties is of value when morals concern
natural individuals, since duty-fulfilling is an achievement of individuals that reaches
beyond the mere satisfaction of what their nature requires. Their existence not being
dependent on or exhausted by fulfilling duties, individuals’ duty-fulfilling constitutes
a value for which they deserve moral praise. In contrast, institutions are, by their
nature, duty related entities. Their existence is bound to a specific goal from which
they derive their statutory duties, and their raison d’eˆtre is exhausted by their
fulfilling these duties. While one properly expects an institution to reliably fulfill the
task it is created for, nobody expects more than that. Hence, if virtue is identified with
duty-fulfilling, attributing virtue to institutions does not seem to have the same moral
significance as attributing virtue to individuals.
Given that duties can be fulfilled for different kinds of reasons, and even vicious
persons can reliably fulfill many of their duties, virtue ethics claims that being
virtuous is not exhausted by duty-fulfilling. Virtues (vices) are usually considered as
stable character traits motivating an agent to act in a specific way, given certain
circumstances. Virtue ethicists distinguish between actions which are ‘‘in accordance
with virtue without requiring virtue for their performance’’ (Foot 2002, p. 13) and
actions which are ‘‘both in accordance with virtue and such as to show possession of
a virtue’’ (ibid.). The distinction suggests a weak and a strong sense of being virtuous.
In the weak sense, an action is virtuous if it conforms to virtue without necessarily
following from it. In the strong sense, an action is virtuous if it follows from virtue.
Conforming to virtue without necessarily witnessing virtue, duty-fulfilling exempli-
fies actions which are virtuous in the weak sense. Duty-fulfilling is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for a person to be virtuous.
Consequently, the minimal requirement for institutions to be virtuous is their
fulfilling their duties for the right motive. But how can we tell simple fulfillment of
institutional duties from their rightly motivated fulfillment? When can a court
fulfilling its duty to neutralize prejudice be characterized as ‘‘showing possession’’
of the virtue of testimonial justice? Is an institution’s virtue a function of its
fulfilling its duties in a more or less efficient, or in a more or less dutiful manner? If
so, virtue seems to reduce to skillfulness in executing duties, and we are back to
square one. If performing the task an institution has been created for is by itself
genuinely virtuous, any institutional well-functioning is virtuous by definition, i.e.
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the conception of institutional virtue is vacuous. Ascribing virtues to institutions
seems to commit us to a more substantial conception of virtue, one that
accommodates the claim that institutions can act in ways that reach beyond the
call of their duties.
If this is on the right lines, the challenge is how to account for an institution’s
property of supererogatory action. The basic constraints on relevant, i.e.
praiseworthy, supererogatory action are mainly agent-based. To be supererogatory
in the ethically relevant sense an action must be performed willfully for the good of
it, without being an action the agent is due to perform. In other terms, the
supererogatory is neither a result of chance nor is it coextensive with the
permissible; moreover, the motivation for acting in the relevant way must not stem
from the agent’s sense of duty, or from his desire to increase his happiness. Insofar,
supererogatory action must be motivated by virtue without being motivated by the
desire to be virtuous. Traditional virtue ethics has it that the virtues giving rise to
supererogatory action are a person’s complex acquired character traits, shaped and
cultivated throughout her existence in various social and normative relations.
Accordingly, attributing substantial virtuous agency to institutions commits us to
account for the complex intentional network, i.e. the virtues, conditioning the
property of supererogatory action. In moral contexts, the most important feature a
theory of institutional properties has to account for is the question of continuity with
individual members’ properties. Does an institution G possessing the morally
relevant property F imply that the members of G possess F? In recent discussion on
collective intentional and morally relevant properties, advocates of non-continuity
argue either by reason of constitutive impossibility, or by reason of normativity.
Constitutive impossibility of continuity pertains to group properties resulting from
inferential procedures in settings of a certain complexity. The so called ‘‘discursive
dilemma’’ is generated in configurations of three or more agents who have to decide
an issue on the basis of two or more premises. The dilemma consists in the fact that
for the group two different, equally valid decisions are possible, depending on
whether the decision is premise based or conclusion based. While the conclusion
based procedure infers the group decision from the conclusions of the individual
inferences, the premise based procedure infers it from the stance the individuals take
on each of the premises. The latter procedure is more rational for the group to take,
but it is discontinuous with the individual members’ rationality. The dilemma
resides in the combinatorics of inferential procedures and is, in settings such as the
described, irresoluble.2
It does not seem very promising, however, to model institutional virtue on the
discursive dilemma script. Readiness to act beyond the call of duty is not a matter of
voting or inferring a conclusion from two or more premises. Rather, it is a
situational evaluation, based on the prima facie evidence of desires, emotions and
perception, which provide the motivational force to act. Moreover, nothing in an
institution’s acting beyond the call of duty—provided such a thing is possible—
implies that continuity in such a case is structurally impossible. To the contrary, if
the Fukushima fire brigade is praised for being brave in the face of the exceptional
2 For a recent overview on the arguments for constitutive discontinuity see List (2010).
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danger of radioactive contamination, not only do we represent bravery in the figure
of the individual fire fighter, but, and this is more important, without individuals
being willing to go beyond the call of duty the brigade’s brave action would simply
not be performed. It seems vain to invoke ‘‘practical identities’’ or ‘‘roles’’ for such
cases, claiming that the brave brigade may very well consist of coward individuals
being brave only to the extent of ‘‘wearing the hat’’ of fire brigade membership.
Considering the possibility of supererogatory action is considering sources of action
that are precisely not captured by role models, status functions or group identities,
but point to traits of individual personality.
The other prominent argument given to support discontinuity of group properties
draws on the observation that collective acting involves specific kinds of normativity,
particularly the entitlement to rebuke any participant for not concurring, as well as its
correlate obligation to promote the fulfillment of the common goal as well as possible.
Gilbert suggests that this normativity responds to the presence of a ‘‘joint
commitment’’, an act by which individuals together openly declare their willingness
for doing or being F ‘‘as a body’’, i.e. to form the ‘‘plural subject’’ of F (Gilbert 1997).
Non-continuity is a main criterion of this account, which states that the plural
subject’s doing or being F is compatible with lack of the corresponding personal
doings or beings F, and that personal intentions are not relevant for the plural subject’s
doing F. Granting that joint commitment has the power of generating genuine plural
properties—among them even attitudinal properties such as beliefs and emotions—
there is still doubt whether it can explain institutional virtue. The problem lies in the
strong normative constraint of Gilbert’s ‘‘joint commitment’’, which strictly prohibits
unilateral rescinding and reveals itself in the inalienable entitlement to rebuke any
member for not complying. If virtuous acting of institutions goes beyond the call of
statutory duties, it seems to exclude the possibility of manifesting a virtue that is
enacted by a commitment entailing reprobation in case of not complying. Whereas it
might be arguable whether fulfilling one’s duties in normal circumstances deserves
moral praise, there is general consensus that not going beyond one’s duties does not
deserve blame. If attributing virtues to institutions implies attributing supererogatory
action, then it implies attributing ways of acting for the non-performance of which one
is not to be blamed. Therefore, institutional virtue seems not likely to be explained on
the model of joint commitment, which is based on being blamable in case of not
complying with the properties enacted by joint commitments.
When applied to institutional virtue, both strategies that explain collective
properties as discontinuous with individual properties exhibit serious shortcomings.
The resistance to discontinuity explanations at least suggests that an institution’s
readiness for supererogatory action and, a fortiori, its virtues, are continuous with
individual properties. Yet distributive interpretations of collective properties have
been repeatedly criticized for not sufficiently explaining the specific nature of the
collective. This might be true if distributive accounts are understood in terms of
mere summative analysis, i.e. as the view that group G’s property VG is the
collection or set of the property tropes VM(G) of G’s individual members
M(G) (Fricker 2010, p. 236f). It need not be true, however, if more sophisticated
accounts of distribution are taken into consideration, accounts that explain the
specificity of the collective property without abandoning continuity. A perspicuous
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account of this kind of distribution is the model of consensus developed in the 1970s
by Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner. Modeling genuine institutional virtue as a
converging ‘‘consensual’’ property, along the lines of the Lehrer–Wagner account of
consensus (LWC), seems a promising way to satisfy the requirements imposed by
the notion of institutional virtue.
2 LWC: the Lehrer–Wagner model of consensus
In order to appreciate the value of LWC for the analysis of genuine institutional
virtue, it is important to recap the requirements this kind of property has to satisfy.
First, the institutional property VG needs to be such that individual property
instances VM(G) integrate with it (continuity claim). Second, in order to deliver
supererogatory action readiness, the property needs to display intentionality and
genuine motivational power (motivation claim). Third, in order to suitably qualify
its bearer, the property needs to display persistence (character claim). Finally, in
order to smoothly adapt to diverse situations, the property needs a dynamic structure
(adaptation claim). How does the LWC satisfy the complex of these requirements?
The roots of the LWC reach to the paper ‘‘Social consensus and rational
agnoiology’’ (Lehrer 1975) where Lehrer attempts to explain group consensus.
Wagner, later Lehrer’s co-author, comments the challenge such an explanation meets:
In practice, group consensus typically emerges from an unstructured
discussion in which individuals modify their initial opinions on the basis of
a complex set of considerations. Such discussion will involve exchange not
only of indisputable facts and inferences, but also of interpretations, intuitions,
and guesses which cannot be supported by rigorous logical or statistical
arguments. (…) Here, attention does (and should) shift from a consideration of
the data to an evaluation of the individual who advocates its cogency. (…)
Thus it is of particular interest to develop systematic theories of group
decision-making in which the respect accorded members of the group by each
other plays an explicit role in the achievement of consensus (Wagner 1978,
p. 336).
This outline neatly suggests how consensus theory overlaps with the require-
ments of an account of institutional virtue. Emphasizing the fact that consensus
typically does not accrue from strictly inferential procedures, it concurs with the
aforementioned observations on collective inferences and the ‘‘discursive
dilemma’’. While collective inferences, on principles of majority and rationality,
lead to commonly accepting the option deemed to be of superior value, they cannot
exclude that opposite opinions prevail in individual members. Discontinuity being
their implicit feature, collective inferences will not deliver consensus, i.e. a
‘‘common’’ or ‘‘shared’’ view on an issue that emerges from aligning different
opinions.3 Yet, the reason given here for not reaching group consensus by means of
3 The result of collective inference can be spelled out in terms of a compromise between different beliefs,
while consensus results from belief revision (see Hartmann et al. 2009 for details on this distinction).
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strictly inferential procedures is rather the complexity of issues, calling for
‘‘interpretations, intuitions, and guesses’’. Now these are precisely the kinds of
evaluations an account of substantial institutional virtue must appeal to in order to
explain what motivates institutions to act beyond the call of duty. Motives for
supererogatory action cannot be inferred from statutory duties, but rather arise from
converging evaluations from which consent to a way of acting flows. Mutual
evaluations of the individuals involved play a decisive role. As Lehrer emphasizes
from the start, consensus theory needs to accommodate not only all individual
assessments of the issue at stake, but also the mutual assignments of trustworthiness
and competence. Accordingly, a crucial element of the consensus theory is to
account for the weight of ‘‘respect’’ each consensus candidate assigns to each other
candidate. The interest of consensus theory to systematically integrate mutual
assessments of personal weights perfectly aligns with the explanatory requirements
of institutional virtue claims. If anything such as an institution’s supererogatory
action can obtain, it is hardly explicable in terms of a commonly accepted opinion
on the appropriate way of acting a situation calls for. An institution will not be ready
to engage in virtuous acting unless the individual members assess each other’s
reliability with regard to the achievement of the envisaged action.
The above outline of some tenets of consensus theory indicates that its desiderata
overlap the requirements of an account of institutional virtue. This corroborates the
conjecture that genuine institutional virtue, if it exists, is a ‘‘consensual’’
phenomenon, i.e. a convergent property aggregating from individual properties,
modellable on LWC. For the following summary of LWC, I will skip its refinement
throughout a set of publications (most prominently Lehrer and Wagner 1980), and
exclusively draw on Lehrer’s use of the model in his paper ‘‘Individualism,
Communitarianism and Consensus’’ (Lehrer 2001). The main focus will be on
whether and how LWC satisfies the basic claims of an account of genuine
institutional virtues, i.e. the continuity claim, the motivation claim, the character
claim and the adaptation claim.
A relevant feature of LWC is to show how agents’ mutually assigning weight to
each other in an iterative process impinges on their reaching consensus. In the
example given in Lehrer (2001), the issue is the distribution of a certain sum of
money to two different charities on which George and Mary need to consent, and it
is assumed that the weight they assign to each other is held constant throughout the
process, although it is ‘‘for them to decide in each state’’ (op.cit., 114). Generalizing
from this example, Lehrer suggests the following formula of a consensual property,
Asþ1j ¼ As1wsj1 þ As2wsj2 þ . . . þ Asnwsjn
where ‘A’ stands for an aggregate allocation (the consensual issue), and ‘w’ for the
weight assigned to agents. Subscripts i, j, k mark individual agents, and superscripts
s mark states or rounds of aggregation (op.cit., 116, 113). LWC models the iterative
structure of consensual properties, i.e. the fact that consensus results from repeated
rounds of mutually assigning weight to each other with regard to deciding on the
issue at stake. Thus, the consensual property A of iteration s ? 1 is a convergent
aggregate property, distributed on each person, j, and as such the ‘‘amalgam’’ of n
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products of individual allocation and mutual weight assignments in the precedent
iteration s. The relevant constraint is that the sum of the weights wsj assigned by each
person, j, to each person including herself equals 1. Then, in each loop of iteration,
each weight wsjk is factored into new aggregates of individual allocations A
sþ1
j , so
that the latter become more and more ‘‘encumbered’’ by every agent’s appraisals.
Being an ‘‘amalgam’’ rather than a sum of individual opinions, the aggregate
consensual property Asþ1j qualifies as both ‘‘individual allocation’’ and ‘‘communal
norm’’ (ibid.). Given the iteration matrix of mutual weight attribution, the dynamic
model of consensual properties makes it pointless to consider an allocation Asþ1j as
either an individual or a collective state: ‘‘The individual allocations and the
communal allocations are identical and symmetrical’’ (op.cit., 115).
3 LWC: modeling institutional virtue
LWC’s main tenets indicate how individual properties integrate with a genuinely
plural property in a way that preserves continuity without making it trivial.
Continuity between individual and collective allocation is enabled and guaranteed
by (i) factoring weight assignments with individual allocations, and (ii) iterating the
sums of these products. Hence, explaining institutional virtue in terms of a
consensual property V sþ1j satisfies the continuity constraint without falling prey to
the objections against summativism. The second constraint on substantial institu-
tional virtue is intended to exclude contingent results from the domain of virtuous
achievement. In order to satisfy this motivation constraint, the property responsible
for the virtuous achievement must exhibit evaluative intentionality, prone to
generate action-relevant motives. Evaluative intentionality involves recognition of a
situation’s action-relevant values and triggers willfulness to engage in ways of
acting that manifest regard for the values recognized. Being designed to account for
aggregating intentional attitudes such as opinions and beliefs, LWC by definition
satisfies the intentionality constraint. Moreover, LWC essentially involves evalu-
ative intentionality, both with regard to the issue at stake and with regard to the
individual agents involved. Even if LWC does not require the process of
convergence to be conscious and intentional on all levels, the model at least
suggests that the consensus reached is an intentional property. The third constraint
on institutional virtue is what I called the character claim, i.e. the claim that in order
to count as a virtue the property assigned to the institution must exhibit persistence
over time, as well as a certain malleability by which it is distinct from simple
dispositions. Unlike natural dispositions such as a glass’ fragility which, given some
definable conditions, unavoidably manifests in the glass’ cracking, a virtue is an
acquired potential whose conditions of manifestation and ways of becoming
manifest are flexible. Moreover, virtues are self-enhancing potentials, i.e. their
manifestation usually strengthens their inherent motivating power. To claim
possession of this kind of property for institutions calls for a dynamic account, able
to explain how the property is developing through time. Modeling a process-
dependent property based on iterating assessment aggregation, LWC seems fit to
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satisfy not only the character constraint but also the adaptation claim. The structure
of LWC guarantees the malleability of virtues to adapt to unexpected situations, by
accommodating reevaluations of issues and participants, as well as changes in the
cast of institutional roles.
Attributing genuine bravery to the Fukushima fire brigade seems adequate if the
following holds: In iterated activities of commonly fulfilling their statutory duties,
each member of the brigade continually assigns weights of trustworthiness and
reliability to each other. The products of the individual firefighters’ more or less
brave performances and the reliability weight mutually assigned to each other
aggregate and converge by iteration to a property V that characterizes the brigade. V
is not a statutory property of the brigade, not something it can establish in its
constitution, or jointly commit to having. Rather, V exemplifies the brigade’s
biography including the relevance of individual performance and character. Those
joining the brigade might have very different motives for their engagement in
firefighting, and not all of them may estimate the motives of the others very highly.
Mutually weighing each other need not concern the ‘‘ideological’’ value of
individual motives, but focuses the extent to which individuals are trustworthy
partners in firefighting. Being enhanced in the course of the brigade’s existence and
performances, V acquires a potential that exceeds the capacity to reliably fulfilling
statutory duties. In the face of an extraordinary challenge, V can motivate the
brigade to go beyond the call of duty. Due to its core features, iteration and mutual
weight assignment, LWC accommodates institutional virtues’ sensitivity to
extraordinary circumstances, as well as their dependence on individual character
and performance.
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